"U.S. Marine Lance Cpl. Brandon Mann, a dog handler with Alpha Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, and native of Arlington, Texas, sights in with his infantry automatic rifle while providing security with Ty, an improvised explosive device detection dog, during a patrol here, Feb. 16, 2012.

"Marines and sailors with 1st LAR and India Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, conducted clearing and disrupting operations in and around the villages of Sre Kala and Paygel during Operation Highland Thunder.

"Marines with 1st LAR led the operation on foot, sweeping for enemy weapons and drug caches through 324 square kilometers of rough, previously unoccupied desert and marshland terrain.

"Mobile units with1st LAR set up blocking positions and vehicle check points while India Company, 3/3 conducted helicopter inserts to disrupt insurgent freedom of movement."

Image: Cpl. Alfred V. Lopez. Caption: DVIDSHUB. [More...]

Operation Anaconda was a plan devised in February of 2002 to trap al Qaeda fighters who were attempting to gather their forces near the 10,000-foot Shah-I-Kot mountains of eastern Afghanistan. They had taken a severe drubbing at Kandahar and elsewhere and sought the security of remote areas to regain their strength. They were observed gathering in Shah-e-Kot Valley near Gardez.

In December of 2001, other al Qaeda fighters had managed to survive the bombing of Tora Bora and escape. This time the United States was determined to put about American-trained Afghan soldiers and as many as 200 highly trained special forces from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, and Norway into the area. These troops were to rouse the al Qaeda and force them to retreat to a point where American forces of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Divisions held key positions, along with special operation forces.

The entire operation was planned and led by Major General Franklin L. Hagenback, who believed it would take about seventy-two hours to accomplish what he termed a “classic hammer and anvil” maneuver.

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CP Note: 2011 marked the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and the 70th anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attacks.

The surface parallels are easy to spot: both surprise attacks, both by air, both shocks to the world.

The article below breaks the surface and drills in, going back and forth between Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and Usama bin Laden,their reasons and motivations for planning and executing Pearl Harbor and 9/11, and the manhunts that followed.

Yamamoto

Much of what the admiral said went against the tide of popular opinion. Once the emperor agreed to make war against the United States, Yamamoto immediately ended his personal opposition, for he would never speak against the Chrysanthemum Throne. He set aside his feelings and accepted who he was—the sword of the emperor, and the one man in Japan who was capable of bringing the United States to its knees.

“What a strange position I find myself in now,” he wrote an old friend. “Having to make a decision diametrically opposed to my own personal opinion, with no choice but to push full-speed in pursuance of the decision.”

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The November 25 prisoner revolt at Qala-i-Jangi near Mazar-i-Sharif in the north shocked coalition authorities into recognizing that the old traditional ways of Afghanistan would not work in this new campaign.

In the words of a Special Forces captain present, [it was] “a full-scale battle.”

CIA officer Mike Spann was the first to die when the detainees attacked, thus tragically becoming the first American killed in the fighting in Afghanistan.

After several days of intense fighting the butcher’s bill was tallied: Several hundred enemy fighters had been killed and scores more wounded, a few holdouts surrendered, and many Northern Alliance soldiers had died or were wounded.

The Qala-i-Jangi fight was a catalyst, in some measure, for two immediate U.S. reactions: First, it was painfully apparent that captured enemy combatants would have to be handled more professionally. Interrogation was obviously impossible under such circumstances and information was sorely needed on the movements of high-value al-Qaeda targets and possible future terror attacks. This could not be done successfully in-country to the extent necessary. Nor was it realistic to expect that surrendered fighters would remain quiescent, cooperative prisoners. Secondly, the leadership realized that slapdash prisoner handling like at Qala-i-Jangi was unacceptable: It led to unnecessary casualties on both sides. [More...]